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Unlike the post-world-war era, democracies are no longer subverted via coups.
Would-be autocrats pursue anti-democratic agendas through laws to imbue them
with a veneer of legitimacy. This renaissance in authoritarianism has thrown into
focus the institution of the legislature, which becomes the primary site for what
Javier Corrales terms ‘Autocratic Legalism’. India is no stranger to the trend of
Autocratic Legalism, and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) has often taken
the aid of the presiding officers in both Houses of the Parliament, to push forward
its anti-democratic agendas. Considering how central a role presiding officers have
played in eroding democracy in India, a radical shakeup to the way presiding officers
are appointed and function is needed to ensure Indian democracy’s long-term
sustainability.
Violating constitutional conventions
The Speaker of the Lower House and the Vice President of India are the presiding
officers of the Lower and Upper House of the Parliament, respectively. In their
absence, the Deputy Speaker in case of the Lower House and Deputy Chairman in
case of the Upper House fill in as presiding officers. The presiding officers regulate
the conduct of the business of the Houses and are the sole authority for every
procedural decision. Because of how these presiding officers are appointed, more
often than not a member of the ruling coalition is the presiding officer in the two
Houses of the Parliament. Constitutional conventions have required presiding
officers to be non-partisan in their conduct, yet, in recent years, their conduct has
been far from that. In fact, in November 2019, the Indian Supreme Court raised
concerns regarding presiding officers making partisan decisions against opposition
members.
Early on in the BJPs tenure, the presiding officer in the Lower House allowed the
BJP Government to pass the Aadhar Act that concerned identity authentication
as a Money Bill. Money Bills which relate to the spending and receiving of money
by the Union Government are not required to go through the Upper House of the
Parliament. Since the BJP Government, at the start of its first term, did not have a
majority in the Upper House, it passed the Aadhar Act as a Money Bill. Further, as
explained by Tarunabh Khaitan, the presiding officer in the Lower House departed
from constitutional conventions and has even refused to acknowledge the leader of
the largest opposition party as the statutorily recognized leader of the opposition.
Nevertheless, this is just the tip of the iceberg as the presiding officer of the Lower
House has continuously ensured reducing the role of the opposition. Amidst the
COVID 19 pandemic, the Indian Parliament was not convened for an extended
period even as the government passed a range of ordinances. When the Parliament
was ultimately convened in September 2020, the presiding officer cancelled the
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question hour and curtailed the zero hour, which was an hour of the day reserved to
raise questions of importance without advanced notice.
Contentious incidents were seen during the same period in the Upper House as
well. Most notable has been the recent passage of the controversial farm bills. In this
instance, the presiding officer in the Upper House declared the law as passed after a
voice vote against which multiple opposition members had protested. The opposition
member’s request for a physical counting of the votes was rejected without providing
any adequate justification. Opposition members, as well as constitutional experts,
have contended that these summary rejections were in direct violation of the rules
of procedures of the Upper House. After the passage of the controversial farm bills,
the presiding officer of the Upper House also suspended eight opposition MPs
for ‘unruly behaviour’. As widespread protests against these bills by the farmers’
organizations continue in large parts of the country, the role of the Parliament as a
deliberative body seems to have been transformed into that of a notice board. It is
worth noting that these are not isolated events in the BJP-controlled Parliament, and
such incidents were witnessed in the past as well.
A radical shakeup
While immediate action by the different players in the system is required to
safeguard Indian democracy, however, its long-term survival and flourishing could
undoubtedly benefit from rethinking parliamentary structures, starting with the
presiding officers in the Parliament. Under the current setup, the presiding officer
of the Lower House is appointed by a simple vote, and the Vice President acts as
the presiding officer of the Upper House. In the absence of these officers, deputy
presiding officers fill in, who in both the Houses are appointed by a simple vote.
As was mentioned earlier, because of how these presiding officers are appointed,
more often than not a member of the ruling coalition is the presiding officer in the two
Houses of the Parliament. Consequently, we propose a radical shakeup to the way
presiding officers are appointed and function. We contend the way forward should be
for a reform in the constitutional structure that would allow for the appointment of two
Associate Speakers and two Deputy Associate Speakers in both the Houses on the
first day of the respective Houses. The ruling coalition would appoint one Associate
Speaker and one Deputy Associate Speaker, and the other Associate Speaker and
Deputy Associate Speaker would be appointed jointly by the opposition coalition and
non-aligned members. It should not matter what percentage of seats the opposition
coalition or non-aligned members have in being able to appoint an Associate or
Deputy Associate Speaker. The two Associate Speakers would alternate as the
presiding officer every six months. In the absence of the Associate Speaker, the
respective coalitions Deputy Associate Speaker would fill in as the presiding officer.
The Indian Parliament has three sessions over the year: the Budget Session
(January/February to May), the Monsoon Session (July to August/September),
the Winter Session (November to December). Effectively one Associate Speaker
would be the presiding officer of the Budget Session in a given year and the other
Associate Speaker the Monsoon and Winter Sessions. So that there is an alteration
between the sessions, an Associate Speaker gets to preside over, we suggest that
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the sessions an Associate Speaker presides in a given year get reversed in the
following year. Simply put, if in a given year an Associate Speaker would preside
over the Budget Session, in the next year they would preside over the Monsoon and
Winter Sessions. Considering the term of the Indian Lower House is five years, one
Associate Speaker would preside over three Budget Sessions and two Monsoon
and Winter sessions. The other Associate Speaker would preside over two Budget
sessions and three Monsoon and Winter Sessions. In a democratic system, it would
only be fair that the ruling coalition gets to decide how they would like the division
of sessions to take place. Though prudence would suggest that the ruling coalition
would prefer that its Associate Speaker presides over three budget sessions
considering its importance. In the Upper House, there would be a different logistical
issue. Members of the Upper House have six-year terms with 1/3 of the seats in the
House up for election every two years. Thus, the ruling and opposition coalitions in
the Upper House are more dynamic. In the case of the Upper House, we suggest
that the Associate Speakers be appointed for two-year renewable terms to account
for the changing compositions of the House.
This new setup we believe would reduce the abuse of their powers by the presiding
officers. Ruling coalition Associate Speakers would be careful about misusing their
powers when presiding officers, for the fear that their coalition might face retribution
when the other Associate Speaker is the presiding officer. The same would go for
when the non-ruling coalition Associate Speakers are presiding officers. They would
be careful before playing hardball to avoid backlash when the tables are reversed.
Such a change in the way presiding officers are appointed and function would allow
the conversion of the present system, which currently does not promote cooperative
outcomes to one which does. In the current system, constitutional conventions,
which themselves seem to face erosion and lack the same strength as they had in
earlier times, are the only checks on the Office of the Speaker. This is also one of
the reasons why we propose alternating 6-month terms where Associate Speakers
preside over different sessions. For example, if each of the Associate Speaker in the
Lower House served as the presiding officer for a continuous term of two and the
half years, they might not feel the need for any short-term cooperation with coalitions
they do not belong to. This could potentially result in a Lower House which would
see two and a half years of aggressive policymaking by the ruling coalition followed
by two and a half years of obstructionism. On the other hand, knowing that within
the same year a particular Associate Speaker’s coalition might need cooperation
from presiding officers not aligned to their coalitions, they might be compelled to
undertake their role as a presiding officer efficiently and fairly. The same logic
applies if Associate Speakers acted as presiding officers for continuous terms in
the Upper House. Additionally, to counterbalance this new regime, similar to the
system already in place, any of the Associate or Deputy Associate Speakers can be
removed by a majority vote of their respective Houses. This could serve as an added
safeguard against any obstructionism by the non-ruling coalition Associate or Deputy
Associate Speakers.
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A backstop to India’s democratic decline
Critics might raise objections with our proposals stating that this would curtail the ‘will
of the people’. However, considering the role of the presiding officer is technically to
regulate parliamentary procedures and ensure the efficient conduct of the business,
we believe that such concerns are slightly overstated. Furthermore, considering
the significant misuse of the position of the presiding officer which has the effect
of threatening democracy itself, this might be a cost worth bearing. Moreover, it is
believed that the success of parliamentary democracies is highly dependent on the
effectiveness of the opposition parties. Completely isolating the opposition parties
is itself bad for democracy and reduces democracy to a sum-zero game where the
losers are entirely locked out. In India, the opposition parties have been rendered
powerless by the ruling government’s manipulation of parliamentary procedures.
Such a change in the status quo could help empower opposition parties without
significantly diluting the electoral success of the ruling coalition.
We believe our suggestion is a small way to get the dice rolling on rethinking
democracy’s structure and processes in India. Changes such as the one suggested
above can act as a backstop to India’s democratic decline and at the same time,
enable better parliamentary deliberation and representation.
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